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The belief in innate human rights has enjoyed increasing 
currency worldwide.  Despite its Western philosophical 
origins and the active opposition of some Islamic, Confucian, 
and indigenous anti-colonial regimes, the idea that all 
individuals possess inalienable rights to life, liberty, and a 
basic economic livelihood has achieved what amounts to a 
near-universal veneration.  Why has this happened?  What 
makes human rights such a sacred idea in today's world?   
Clearly, the theology of human rights has been fostered by 
increased global social interconnections, not the least of 
which has been the late-20th century communications 
revolution.  Yet this trend is more importantly the result of a 
moral individualism called forth by the structure of an 
interdependent late modernity.  The belief in the sacredness 
of human rights both expresses this individualism and serves 
as a counter-weight to the anti-systemic and neo-
particularistic ideologies that globalization also creates.  The 
battle between universal human rights and resurgent 
nationalisms is thus the theological battle of our age.  Yet it is 
not just an intellectual but a social battle; by laying bare its 
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TEXT 
 
The belief in innate human rights has enjoyed increasing currency 
worldwide.  A product of the European Enlightenment, it grew out of the 
West's struggle against monarchy.1  There, it proved a useful weapon for 
a bourgeoisie that was eager to develop a new and less restrictive social 
order.  Once established at home, rights-language was exported 
worldwide with the other staples of Western dominance: trade goods, 
guns, and Coca Cola.  At times it helped justify Western conquest by 
appealing to non-Western insurgents who were eager to overthrown their 
despotic rulers.  It has also proved a useful tool for those natives who 
wished to escape Western control.  If all peoples "are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights," to quote the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence, then any power--Western ones included--that threatens 
people's life, liberty, or pursuit of happiness deserves to be felled.   
Concern for human rights thus seemed an easy way to moralize 
politics and to undermine tyranny.  The tide ran swift, reaching a high 
point with the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.  
That and later U.N. documents specified a host of political, civil, social 
and economic rights that the world's governments were to guarantee to 
their citizens.2  Many countries signed on.3  Human rights became a 
theoretical, if not always a practical, force in the world. 
                                                 
                                                                                                                    
1   The individual rights proclaimed in the 1948 U.N. Declaration of Human 
Rights are grounded in the revolutionary philosophies of law that were put 
forth by the 17th century European philosophers Grotius and Locke, and 
were developed over the next century by Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant and 
the encyclopédistes.  See Ricoeur (1986), Taylor (1986), Forsythe (1989), 
and Spickard (forthcoming: ch. 2). 
2    The 1948 Declaration proclaimed human rights as a universal and 
transcultural concept.  Two 1966 Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights 
and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) grounded these rights in 
agreements between contracting states (see Diemer, 1986).  Further treaties 
and declarations have sought to protect the rights of women, the rights of 
ethnic and cultural minorities, the rights of children, the right to economic 
development, and so on. 
3    Not all countries have signed all documents, however.  The United States, 
for example, only ratified the 1966 Covenant of Civil and Political Rights in 
Yet such agreements have brought neither universal rights nor 
international peace.  The Cold War pitted the capitalist/democratic "First 
World", with its tradition of civil and political rights, against the 
communist "Second World", which preferred rights to economic and 
social equality.  These two types of rights are usually called "first-
generation" and "second-generation" rights respectively, because of the 
order in which they entered Western civic philosophies.  The Universal 
Declaration contained both; from 1948 to 1989, the "West" and the "East" 
traded charges of rights violations almost continuously.  Each accused the 
other of violating its favorite rules.  Each conveniently ignored its own 
flaws. 
Recent years have seen a push for a third generation of rights: the 
rights of cultural groups.  Though not often found in international treaties, 
the notion of "third-generation rights" supports the various groups' claims 
to land, to cultural practices, to the use of their own languages, and even 
to quasi-sovereignty.  Just as the land demands of Brazilian and Canadian 
aborigines depend on notions of group rights, so do the pro-French 
language laws of Quebec and the Latvian efforts to deny full citizenship 
to Russian-speakers.  In each case, groups assert rights both against other 
groups and against individuals.4
In all these cases, the call for human rights has achieved what 
amounts to near universal veneration.  It has become a cultural icon, even 
1992--and then did so with a host of exceptions that many countries said 
gutted the measure.  The U.S. has still not signed the companion Convenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
4    These three types of rights are often in conflict.  How can English-speaking 
Quebecois exercise their rights to free speech if they are banned from using 
their own language in public because of French-speakers' group rights to 
maintain their French linguistic heritage?  Does the dominance of one or the 
other language disadvantage French- or English-speakers socially, 
economically, or educationally?  If so, does this constitute a violation of their 
individual rights?  Or does it constitute a fulfillment of a cultural group's 
rights to political, social, and economic dominance in its own territory?  The 
complexities will only be compounded if Quebec secedes from Canada, as 
many French-speaking Quebecois apparently hope.  Will the Native peoples 
who inhabit the northern two-thirds of the province themselves secede?  And 
will the French-speakers let them?  Settling such rights conflicts is not a task 
for the faint of heart. 
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for those who are not particularly clear about the grounds on which they 
base their claims.  My local newspaper--in Texas, no less--every day 
contains stories about people who claim that their "rights" have been 
violated: the right to privacy, the right keep the money one earns (and 
thus not pay taxes), animal rights, the rights of the unborn.  The idiom of 
rights is used to support anything that anyone thinks necessary for dignity 
and freedom, however defined. 
This growth of rights discourse has occurred despite the active 
opposition of some Islamic, Asian, and indigenous anti-colonial regimes.  
They argue that rights-language stems from Western philosophic 
principles and is thus not applicable to non-Western societies.5  For 
example, Iran has publicly stated that the U.N. Declaration does not apply 
to Islamic countries, because Islamic law posits a different relationship 
between the individual and the state; so Iran persecutes Baha'is, denying 
their freedom of religion.6  China and Singapore have similarly claimed 
that a focus on individual rights undercuts the Confucian ethics on which 
their social orders rest; speech is limited and those who criticize their 
governments may be summarily jailed.7  Both Islamicists and 
                                                 
Confucianists call Western-style human rights a form of 'cultural 
imperialism', to which they need not bend.  Even Japan's recent Prime 
Minister Hosokawa declared that "the Western concept of human rights 
should not be blindly applied to all nations."
5 For example, Kishore Mahbubani, of the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, has urged the irrelevance of Western rights ideals thusly: 
"Value systems, such as human rights and freedom of the press, are 
choices which each society must make.  In the United States, 
individual rights are placed ahead of law and order.  In Asia, law 
and order have priority over human rights.  These are simply 
alternative value systems.  None are superior over the other.  
Asians and Westerners must emancipate themselves from notions 
that Western value systems are superior to Asian value systems." 
(Quoted by Chew 1994: 936) 
6 See, inter alia, Piscatori (1980), Hassan (1982), Zakaria (1986), Keddie 
(1988), Farhang (1988), An-Na'im (1990), Mayer (1988, 1991), Farrag 
(1990), and Dwyer (1991).  Sinaceur (1986) confirms this different 
relationship, while still admitting the possibility of Islamic rights standards.  
Little, Kelsay, and Sachedina (1988) uncover strands of Western-style 
religious liberties within the Islamic tradition. 
7 Marshall (1993).  On Chinese notions of human rights, see: Henkin (1978), 
Cheng (1979), Leng (1980), Lee (1982), Hsiung (1985), Edwards, Henkin, 
and Nathan (1986), Chiu (1987, 1989), Ames (1988), Lubis (1990), 
Rosemont (1988, 1991a, 1991b), Shih (1993), Nathan (1994), and Tang 
(1995).  Woo (1980) describes the philosophy behind the Chinese challenge, 
8  
Yet these regimes recognize the power of the human rights ideal, at 
the same time as they combat it.  Their opposition to Western human 
rights notions has had to take the form of alternative rights philosophies, 
the development of which has become a something of a growth industry 
among Asianist intellectuals.9  (I am of course speaking only of 
principled opposition, not the opportunistic kind that uses anti-rights 
arguments to support dictatorial power; those who doubt the existence of 
principled opposition should consult my forthcoming book on the 
subject.)   
Why has this happened?  What makes human rights so sacred in 
today's world?  For that is what rights are: sacred ideals.  People treat 
human rights as hallowed organizing principles for life: as prior and 
superior to ordinary legal and social rules.  They feel that human rights 
are sacrosanct, that they must be protected against corruption.  To accuse 
a government or a person of violating human rights is to accuse them of 
more than a crime; it is to accuse them of boundless evil.  To rape is a 
crime, to rape as an instrument of warfare or state policy should be (so 
argues Catherine MacKinnon) a human rights offense, even though there 
is already no society on earth that condones it.10  Clearly human rights 
violations are beyond criminality, in the contemporary view.  I meant 
literally my previous reference to human rights as "cultural icons": the 
concept of human rights is an icon in late modernity precisely because it 
connects people to something beyond and greater than themselves, it 
invokes feelings of awe, reverence, and it may even motivate people to 
act in ways that may endanger their lives. 
Even the most passing student of Durkheim should smell religion in 
all this.  Not institutional religion, to be sure--though human rights 
institutions also proliferate worldwide--but religion just the same.  The 
                                                                                                                    
while leaving open the possibility of developing an indigenous human rights 
standard.  
8 Los Angeles Times 3/22/94.  See also Huntington (1993). 
9 E.g.: Hall and Ames (1987), Ames (1988), Rosemont (1988, 1991a, 1991b). 
10 MacKinnon (1993).  See also Gibson (1993). 
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human rights movement has its sacred histories and texts, its holy 
discourses, its rituals, its saints and demons.  It is, in short, wide open for 
religious analysis. 
That is not, however, the focus of this presentation.  I am more 
interested in a further question that Durkheim might have posed, had he 
been faced with this modern phenomenon.  Granting for now the religious 
or religion-like aspect of the human rights trend, I want to know what the 
current sacred prominence of human rights ideals tells us about our late-
modern social order.  For this worldwide reverence for a social ideal is 
something new on this planet.  There have been religions before, and lots 
of them.  There have been social philosophies of equivalent scope; 
Marxism, indeed, expressed the aspirations of a large portion of humanity 
and did much to shape the century now closing.  But its age has passed, 
and the age of human rights has dawned.  What can we learn about late 
modernity from this fact?  Why this particular philosophy?  And why 
now? 
Diagnosing the Social Order 
 
Clearly, the global spread of human rights ideas has been fostered by 
increased social interconnections, not the least being the late-20th century 
communications revolution.  It is trite but true to say that ideas fly around 
the world faster than ever before.  During the Chinese information 
blockade at the height of the Tian'anmen crisis in June, 1989, I was in 
constant touch with those on the scene by telex and fax; both networks 
proved to be crucial links between the demonstrators and the outside 
world.  Communications media are now so decentralized that few borders 
block ideas.  A dictatorship's walls may have ears, but it would need to fit 
its citizens' ears with walls to keep foreign ideas away. 
Despite Marshall McLuhan's famous dictum, however, the medium 
is not the message.  At least the mere existence of global information 
networks does not tell us why those networks are abuzz with human 
rights ideas rather than their opposite.  For if mere communication were 
the issue, would not one expect all ideas to profit equally?  Even white-
supremacist militias now claim to be fighting for their human rights. 
Content is important, and in the case of human rights it consists of 
three linked ideological elements: moral individualism, equality, and 
interconnectedness.  The first presumes that individuals are the key unit 
of society and also presumes these individuals' ultimate worth.  For moral 
individualists, "individuals"--separate and separable persons--possess 
something called "rights" as part of their very nature.  They are rights-
bearers.  This thinking sees individuals as metaphysically prior to social 
life; so are the rights they claim against the state and against one another.  
Many philosophers and sociologists have criticized this doctrine, but it is 
nevertheless widespread.11
Accompanying this, however, is an emphasis on human equality.  
Human rights advocates presume that all people are equal--a position 
contradicted by the majority of the world's indigenous philosophies.12  
Yet even the Chinese, whose traditional philosophy is among the most 
hierarchical, seem reluctant to argue against human rights on these 
grounds.  Instead, they balance individual rights against the stability of 
the social order, arguing for "the significance of national and regional 
particularities"13 in limiting individual rights claims.  They typically 
claim that economic and social rights are more important that civil and 
political rights, not that there are no rights at all. 
The third element--interconnectedness--is less prominent in 
contemporary human rights discourse than it is in the environmentalist 
ideologies that have emerged during the same period.  Environmentalists 
emphasize the mutual dependence of species and the ties between peoples 
and their ecosystems.  In the human rights arena, however, notions of 
interconnectedness emerge from the networks of rights activists, which 
now extend worldwide.  According to Amnesty International, Americas 
Watch, Asia Watch, and other rights organizations, human rights activists 
cannot afford to let rights violations occur anywhere, no matter how 
obscure.  One does not protest and lobby just on behalf of Chinese 
dissidents, African victims of clitoridectomy, or American death-row 
inmates.  One certainly does not work just to impose Western standards 
of rights on others.  Instead, one works in tandem with rights advocates 
worldwide, working everywhere to make the world conform to a human 
                                                 
11 E.g.: Bellah et al (1985). 
12 Spickard (forthcoming: ch. 3 & 4) contains descriptions of various anti-rights 
philosophies, including some Western ones.  See also the references in notes 
6 and 7, above. 
13 Para. 8 of the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, 2 April, 1993. 
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rights code that is seen as universal and holy.  Rights-violations that 
threaten one are seen to threaten all.   
Besides these three themes, human rights ideologies are 
universalistic.  They see themselves as champions of one world, 
indivisible.  Their enemies are the world's particularisms: the 
nationalisms, ethnic patriotisms, and limited visions that exalt one group 
or society above another.  It was no mistake that the first major human 
rights document was called "The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights."  It promised to be the first set of universal ideals, toward which 
all governments and peoples could strive. 
Yet if we look around us, there is certainly a counter-movement.  
Nationalism infects societies on almost every continent.  Ethnic and 
religious genocide is on the nightly news.  This is not new, but it is more 
prominent today than it has been for over a century.  Particularism and 
universalism seem both to be strong trends in world affairs. 
Why should this be happening now?  Why do individualism, 
equality, and interconnectedness make so much sense to people now, in 
late modernity?  Why do universalism and particularism share the world 
stage?  Just as Durkheim would sense the religiousness of the human 
rights movement, I think that he would connect these cultural trends to 
the late-modern social order.  I want to spend the rest of this paper 
suggesting how. 
The Structure of Late-Modernity 
 
Three structural aspects of late modernity seem to me to encourage both 
cultural particularism and the veneration of universal human rights.  The 
first of these is globalization.  The increasing relevance of global social 
processes is much in the popular press and has been analyzed at length by 
social theorists more skilled than I.  Peter Beyer points out that 
globalization  
is more than the spread of one historically existing culture at 
the expense of all others.  It is also the creation of a new 
global culture with its attendant social structures, one which 
increasingly becomes the broader social context of all 
particular cultures in the world, including those of the 
West.14
Central to my analysis is this structural aspect: the wide reach of global 
economic and political institutions.  We are now all involved in one 
another's lives.  This is a major change from previous eras. 
According to Beyer, globalization elicits two seemingly opposite 
responses from the religious sphere.  Religions may embrace the global 
world or they may resist it.  The former is the path of universalism: a 
cultural outlook that says, in effect, 'We are all in this together and we'd 
better learn how to cooperate.'  This may involve a celebration of cultural 
diversity, but it does so within a meta-celebration of universal equality 
and interconnection.  Human rights ideologies are of this type, as are 
environmentalism, one-worldism, and various ecumenisms.  Such 
religious and quasi-religious ideologies all stress the unity of the human 
family. 
Beyer notes that a countertrend is just as likely, however.  Religious 
and quasi-religious ideologies may respond to their new global context by 
retrenchment--by emphasizing their distinctness.  To use Beyer's 
felicitous phrase, this is "a 'fundamentalist' response that allows change 
under the insistence that nothing fundamental is changing."15  
'Fundamentalist' Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc., are not religions of 
the past; in fact they are ideologically new and generate qualitatively new 
social forces--such as armed and unarmed terrorism--as a way of 
revitalizing an imagined history.  Though they oppose the human rights 
movement's universalism, they arise in response to the same social trend. 
A second structural characteristic of late modernity is an 
increasingly complex division of labor.  Economic specialization is 
increasingly widespread, but cultural specialization is not far behind.  
Compare, for example, major universities of today with those of a 
hundred years ago.  Is there one among us who is encouraged to work as 
broadly as were our intellectual predecessors?  The increased training 
needed by the skilled labor force, as well as the declining fortunes of 
unskilled labor of any kind, demonstrate the trend.  Where Marx thought 
that capitalism could be brought to its knees by the unity of unskilled 
                                                 
14 Beyer (1994: 9). 
15 Beyer (1994:10). 
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laborers, recent history has shown that highly trained specialists wield 
much more social and economic power. 
But what is the ideological correlate of this training?  I submit that 
Durkheim was right in seeing individualism as the ideology of the future 
and in seeing social individuation, brought about by an increasing 
division of labor, as its chief social support.  I do not have time for details 
here, but think for a moment whether the highly skilled or the unskilled 
are more or less likely to see the individual as the ideal unit of social 
analysis.  To the degree that people know that they are different from 
others--and that they have developed those differences through the hard 
work of training for a socially differentiated career--they will be more 
likely to find plausible the notion that there is something unique about 
each person.  Each person becomes a seat of value.  It is but a small step 
from this apprehension of specialness to the ideology of innate individual 
human rights. 
But the division of labor does not just affect individuals; it effects 
society too.  An increased division of labor makes people depend on each 
other more.  Wider networks of goods and services tie people to one 
another.  Borders become less relevant as growing division of labor 
increases international communications and commerce.  The result is an 
interconnected world--just the world that globalization theorists describe.  
Inhabitants of this world are prone to see their ties with others, their 
similarities despite differences and their mutual dependence.  Human 
rights ideologies are again made plausible, this time at the level of their 
acknowledgment of human interconnection.  It makes sense that 
philosophies of interconnectedness would arise to reflect an increasingly 
functionally integrated world. 
Here are the three theological themes I identified above for 'the 
human rights religion': universal equality, individualism, and 
interconnection.   Here are their social causes: globalization, increased 
individuation and interconnectedness, the latter two driven by a growing 
worldwide division of labor.  Universal individual human rights make 
sense to people in such social circumstances. 
As Beyer points out, however, social-structural changes do not 
necessarily bring forth identical responses in all people; in this case they 
are just as likely to result in counter-systemic as systemic reactions.  Thus 
we have human rights advocates along with various kinds of cultural 
fundamentalists; we have increased attention to universal liberties at the 
same time as we have increased nationalism and particularism.  If the 
foregoing analysis is right, both are driven by the same cause: the social 
changes underlying the emergence of late modernity. 
Previous commentators have noted that the fight for universal 
human rights and against nationalist particularisms is the theological 
battle of our age.  With this paper, I merely wish to note that this 
theological battle has social underpinnings.  Human rights discourse has 
become popular now because it speaks to the changed circumstances of a 
globalized, multi-cultural world.  It is not the only ideology to do so, 
however.  It is not yet clear whether the universalizing or the 
particularizing ideologies aroused by late modernity will triumph in the 
end. 
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